Spyridon N. Litsas: "The 12-day war and the dead horse theory" [Kathimerini, 8/7/25]

 

Disclaimer: All opinions and arguments expressed by CFIR-GR are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the organization. 

Originally published at: https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1274574/the-12-day-war-and-the-dead-horse-theory/

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran was a typical Middle Eastern conflict, characterized by its high intensity, brief duration and the victory claims of all the involved sides. However, this open and direct clash between the two nations, Israel and Iran, which have despised and mistrusted each other since late 1979, is more complex in its outcomes and more instrumental in regional power struggles.

First and foremost, this clash demonstrated Israel’s superiority in defense technology and at the air force level. The Israeli strikes that were carried out with surgical precision against Iranian nuclear scientists and high-ranking military officers once again proved that Jerusalem has the edge in preemptive and preventive strikes from a distance. This gives Israel the advantage of the first strike and also creates a safe zone for citizens and critical infrastructure. However, this time Iran proved it can hit targets in Israel. The Iron Dome was effectively operational once again; however, due to the density of Iranian strikes, it revealed certain shortcomings.

Still, it’s also important to note that while Israel maintains strong national unity, Iran’s extended nuclear capacity has exposed internal issues within the elite circles that make up the Iranian deep state. While Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his close circle threatened to open Pandora’s box for Israel and its allies, the army’s decision-making process appeared more moderate, willing to make concessions – if not directly to Israel, then certainly to Washington.

If the 12-day war aimed to prevent Iran from joining the prestigious international nuclear club in the near future, then Israel should be satisfied. However, that was not the case. Israel’s strategic goal was to push back Iran’s nuclear plan for many years, gaining some considerable time to get more well-prepared for the next stage. Thus, Israel needed US help to hit the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, and it is the first time in the recent history of the Middle East struggles that Jerusalem is involved in, that a helping hand from Washington was not just welcomed but obligatory for the positive ending of the preventive strikes. Still, no one can say if the strike was decisive against Iran’s nuclear ambitions or if it just delayed them for a few months. If both sides wanted to test their allies’ reactions, then the American response clearly sent a message to Israel, while Iran cannot say the same about Russia or China.

The question now is whether this lack of support from Moscow and Beijing was because no one feels secure with a nuclear Iran or because both Russia and China wanted to avoid a direct conflict with the US over Iran. But there’s also the possibility that neither of the above is accurate, and that Moscow and Beijing knew the Iranian nuclear program wasn’t affected by the American strikes. So, they decided that there was no need for an escalation of the crisis on their behalf. This would present a serious challenge for both Israel and the rest of the Western world.

The period from Hamas’ terrorist attack on Israel until now has eliminated all proxies between Jerusalem and Tehran. Now, the two adversaries can confront each other directly and decide their next move in the Middle East’s strategic landscape. However, this is not a one-on-one conflict. Key players in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Qatar, have already, in one way or another, been part of the equation, which is connected not just to the Israeli-Iranian clash but to the choice of sides within the existing systemic bipolarity. Undoubtedly, this process is more significant than the 12-day war itself and equally challenging in relation to Iranian nuclear ambitions. 

Last but not least, is the crisis affectingthe balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean? Turkey has a lot to worry about. Russia supplies expertise for its nuclear program. This concerns the US and Erdogan must not disregard this. 

The American president has shown that, like the experienced businessman he is, he can smile while shaking hands and unleash hell if you challenge the US security agenda. Turkey also needs to be concerned about Israel. Jerusalem has made it clear it will not tolerate a revisionist power with an openly anti-Israeli agenda and provocative antisemitic rhetoric. Indeed, a nuclear Turkey would be a problem for the entire world, but a thorn in the side for specific countries, Israel among them. Athens and Nicosia have kept their composure during these 12 days without compromising their security or alliance networks. 

 

Still, it’s clear that both Greece and Cyprus are prisoners of geography and urgently need an alternative economic growth model. In a neighborhood where Turkey and Iran are vying for influence, relying solely on tourism for economic prosperity seems naive. Hellenism needs to shift its focus toward AI and maritime industries to generate primary wealth and reduce asymmetric interdependence stemming from regional volatility.