Seventy years ago this week, Israeli forces crossed into Sinai. Within days, British and French troops had landed at Port Said. By November 6 the operation was over. Egyptian resistance did not stop it, nor did Soviet threats. A run on sterling did, together with Washington\u2019s refusal to intervene on London\u2019s behalf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Suez Crisis confirmed, in a particularly humiliating fashion for Britain, the transfer of Western hegemony from London to Washington. That transfer had quietly begun nearly a decade earlier, in February 1947, when Britain informed the United States that it could no longer sustain Greece and Turkey. The Truman Doctrine followed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Britain emerged from the Second World War severely weakened. The conflict had undermined its ability to sustain a global empire, while nationalist and anti-colonial movements stripped away India, Burma, Ceylon, and the Palestine mandate. The Suez Canal, however, remained central to British imperial strategy. It connected the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and carried a large share of international trade and Middle Eastern oil. British maritime supremacy rested not only on naval strength but also on control of the strategic infrastructure through which global commerce flowed. Suez was both a symbol and an instrument of British power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. London regarded the decision as a direct threat to what remained of Britain\u2019s imperial position. Prime Minister Anthony Eden entered into a secret arrangement with France and Israel to reverse the Egyptian fait accompli. On October 29, Israel invaded Sinai. British and French forces followed. The operation succeeded tactically and failed strategically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n